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Measuring the systemic importance 
of financial institutions using market 
information
Introduction
The recent crisis has shifted the focus from the assess-
ment of the resilience of individual financial institutions 
towards a more systemic approach. Hence, it is expected 
that macro-prudential supervision and regulation will play 
a vital role in the new financial architecture. In particular, 
experts  are  advocating  financial  regulation  focused  on 
limiting systemic risk. As illustrated by the current crisis, an 
important aspect of systemic risk, which broadly speaking 
is the risk of a widespread crisis in the financial system, 
is the propagation of adverse shocks to a single institu-
tion through the rest of the system. Therefore, mitigating 
the risk stemming from so-called systemically important 
institutions,  i.e.  the  financial  institutions  whose  failure 
generates a large adverse impact on the financial system, 
has been identified as an important policy item. In particu-
lar, consideration is currently being given in a number of 
jurisdictions to the possibility of applying special policies, 
such as a tax or capital surcharge, to systemically impor-
tant institutions. The purpose of this type of regulations 
would be to reduce the probability of failure of systemi-
cally important institutions and to mitigate the impact of 
their failure if that nevertheless occurred.
Yet,  a  crucial  step  in  macro-prudential  supervision  and 
regulation  aimed  at  reducing  the  risk  of  systemically 
important  institutions  is  to  identify  which  institutions 
are in fact systemically important. However, this is not a 
straightforward task, and the existing proposals on the 
matter  still  seem  far  from  having  developed  the  ideal 
measure of systemic importance.
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  provide  a  conceptual 
discussion regarding the notion of systemic importance, 
to identify specific issues that need to be taken into con-
sideration when designing a measure of systemic impor-
tance, and to review existing measures of systemic impor-
tance based on market information. Measures based on 
market information have recently attracted considerable 
attention, as they only require publicly available data that 
in many cases are quicker than the alternative approaches 
at detecting (changes in) systemic importance.
The absence of a solid conceptual background for meas-
uring systemic importance hampers the design of proper 
measures of the systemic importance of financial institu-
tions, and blurs the comparison of the various approaches 
suggested in the evolving literature in this field. In this 
context, we argue that, although systemic risk and sys-
temic importance have some similarities, they are distinct 
concepts that differ in their defining aspects and drivers. 
In order to properly measure the systemic importance of a 
financial institution, the measure must concentrate on the 
institution’s potential impact on the system in the event 
of failure or distress, which largely boils down to captur-
ing the spillover or contagion effects from the institution 
in question to the rest of the system. This entails a major 
challenge,  as  spillover  effects  operate  through  several 
channels, both direct and indirect. In addition, determin-
ing  systemic  importance  of  a  financial  institution  may 
entail separating spillover or contagion effects from the 
effects of a systematic shock through common exposures, 
as  well  as  identifying  cascade  or  domino  effects.  Our 
assessment of existing measures against this background 
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suggests that none of the proposed measures seems to 
actually succeed in precisely identifying the impact on the 
system of the failure or distress of an individual financial 
institution.
The  remainder  of  the  article  is  organized  as  follows. 
Section 1 presents a conceptual discussion on the notion 
of systemic importance and its main drivers. In this sec-
tion, we also advance some specific identification issues 
that need to be taken into consideration when designing 
a  measure  of  systemic  importance.  Section  2  discusses 
the use of market information for the measurement of 
systemic  importance  and  presents  the  methodologies 
used in the construction of the existing measures of sys-
temic importance based on market information. A critical 
assessment  of  these  measures  against  the  main  issues 
identified  in  Section  1  will  be  presented  in  Section  3. 
Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
1.  The concept of systemic importance
In this section we define the concept of systemic impor-
tance and identify the main factors that affect an institu-
tion’s  systemic  importance.  These  will  determine  which 
type  of  information  a  measure  of  systemic  importance 
should contain, and to which factors or drivers it should 
respond. We first briefly discuss the definition and driv-
ing factors of the more general notion of systemic risk. 
The purpose is to highlight the differences between the 
concepts of systemic risk and systemic importance. In par-
ticular, we will argue that some of the factors that affect 
the level of systemic risk should not be reflected in the 
measure of an individual institution’s systemic importance. 
Finally, we end this section by discussing some specific 
issues  which  concern  identification  of  the  impact  of  a 
financial institution’s failure or distress.
1.1  Defining systemic importance
1.1.1  Systemic risk
Given  the  many  systemic  risk  sources  and  channels, 
there is no generally accepted definition of systemic risk. 
In  some  cases,  a  description  of  the  “phenomenon”  of 
systemic risk and its different dimensions is given, rather 
than a succinct definition.  (1) More concise definitions of 
systemic risk can be found in e.g. Acharya et al. (2009, 
p.283) and IMF/BIS/FSB (2009, p.2), who define systemic 
risk as “the risk of a crisis in the financial sector and its 
spillovers to the economy at large” or “a risk of disruption 
to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment 
of  all  or  parts  of  the  financial  system  and  (ii)  has  the 
potential to have serious negative consequences for the 
real economy”, respectively. Finally, more applied papers 
that attempt to measure the level of systemic risk gener-
ally narrow their focus on the vulnerabilities and effects 
within  the  financial  sector  itself,  ignoring  the  potential 
spillovers to and from the real economy. In these papers, 
systemic risk refers to the risk of the simultaneous failure 
of a substantial number of financial institutions.  (2)
1.1.2  Systemic importance
Like the concept of systemic risk, the definitions of a sys-
temically important financial institution seem to differ in 
specific respects. The main differences again relate to the 
scope of the definition, i.e. whether the focus should only 
be on the financial system or on the real economy as well. 
For instance, whereas ECB (2006, p.132) in its discussion 
of large and complex banking groups refers to “institu-
tions whose size and nature of business is such that their 
failure and inability to operate would most likely spread 
and have adverse implications for the smooth functioning 
of financial markets or other financial institutions operat-
ing  within  the  system”,  IMF/ BIS/ FSB  (2009,  p.8)  states 
that  for  assessing  the  systemic  importance  of  financial 
institutions the main criteria relate to “their potential to 
have a large negative impact on the financial system and 
the real economy”. Similar definitions that also consider 
the impact on both the financial system and the real econ-
omy can be found in FSA (2009), Thomson (2009) and 
Zhou (2009). Finally, IMF/ BIS/ FSB (2009, p.5) notes that 
with  respect  to  systemic  importance  “some  authorities 
focus on the impact on the financial system, while others 
consider the ultimate impact on the real economy as key”.
Hence, in its narrowest sense, a financial institution can 
be considered to be systemically important if its failure or 
distress would have a significant adverse impact on the 
financial system. This impact will to a large extent result 
from spillover or contagion effects, which, as we discuss 
below,  operate  through  many  different  channels.  As  a 
consequence, and owing to several other issues that will 
be identified in the remainder of this article, measuring 
the impact on the financial system of the failure or distress 
of a financial institution, and hence deciding on that insti-
tution’s degree of systemic importance, is by no means a 
straightforward task.
(1)  See e.g. ECB (2009) and IMF (2009).
(2)  See e.g. Lehar (2005), Giesecke and Kim (2009), Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009a,b), 
and Tarashev, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2009a,b).129
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1.2  Drivers of systemic importance
1.2.1  Drivers of systemic risk
In general, the level of systemic risk is determined by two 
general types of drivers : the default probabilities of the 
system’s institutions, and the dependence or correlation 
of defaults of institutions in the system.
individual	default	probabilities
The first driver of systemic risk is the level of individual 
risk facing the institutions in the system ; the higher the 
probabilities of default of those individual institutions, the 
greater the risk of the simultaneous failure or distress of 
a substantial number of financial institutions, and hence, 
the higher the level of systemic risk.
Dependence	of	defaults
The dependence structure or correlation of the defaults 
of the different institutions in the system determines the 
degree of default clustering in the system, i.e. the prob-
ability that the failure of a substantial number of financial 
institutions  occurs  at  the  same  time.  This  dependence 
structure  is  essentially  determined  by  two  underlying 
forces : common exposures and spillover channels.
Common exposures The degree of common exposures 
of  financial  institutions  determines  to  what  extent  the 
institutions’ asset portfolios are vulnerable to similar risk 
factors. When financial institutions are to a large extent 
exposed  to  common  risk  factors,  a  systematic  shock 
may adversely affect many institutions at the same time 
and pose a potentially large threat to the stability of the 
financial system : thus, common exposures increase the 
risk of the simultaneous failure or distress of a substantial 
number of financial institutions, and therefore the level of 
systemic risk.
Spillover  channels  The  second  determinant  of  risk 
dependence in the system is the presence of spillover or 
contagion channels, through which (idiosyncratic) shocks 
may spread from one institution to the rest of the financial 
system. If shocks to an institution easily spill over to the 
other institutions in the system, this again raises the prob-
ability that a substantial number of financial institutions 
fails at the same time.
The  literature  has  identified  several  direct  and  indirect 
channels through which spillover effects operate.  (1) The 
most  obvious  spillover  channels  are  direct  exposures 
between  financial  institutions  through  the  interbank 
money market and counterparty relations (e.g. derivative 
markets,  payment  systems).  However,  there  are  also 
indirect  contagion  channels,  such  as  the  adverse  price 
effects on the asset portfolio of other financial institu-
tions in the system in the case of asset fire sales by a 
particular  institution  in  distress.  In  addition,  owing  to 
imperfect and asymmetric information, the failure of one 
institution may trigger contagious bank runs in retail and 
wholesale (e.g. interbank) markets. Finally, the failure or 
distress  of  a  financial  institution  may  lead  to  negative 
feedback  loops  between  the  financial  sector  and  the 
real  economy.  Overall,  these  channels  can  be  classified 
as specific elements of the general concept of “intercon-
nectedness”,  both  between  financial  institutions  within 
the  financial  system  and  between  the  financial  system 
and the real economy : i.e., spillover channels directly or 
indirectly interconnect the different financial institutions 
in the system (and the financial institutions with the real 
economy). Finally, note that these channels are not mutu-
ally exclusive and may co-exist.
1.2.2  Drivers of systemic importance
The  importance  of  spillover  effects  in  determining  the 
impact of a financial institution on the system in the case 
of failure or distress implies that the presence of systemi-
cally  important  institutions  increases  the  potential  level 
of systemic risk. On the other hand, even in the absence 
of  (individually)  systemically  important  institutions,  the 
level of systemic risk may be high ; for instance, consider 
a financial system consisting of small and unconnected 
banks with a large degree of common exposures. In the 
following paragraphs, we discuss the extent to which the 
main drivers of systemic risk also apply as determinants 
of systemic importance. We also briefly discuss two addi-
tional factors that have been commonly identified as driv-
ers of systemic importance : the institution’s size and the 
substitutability of its activities.  (2)
individual	default	probabilities
In measuring the systemic importance of a financial insti-
tution, it is important to distinguish between the default 
probability of the institution in question, and the default 
probabilities of the other institutions in the system.
Default probability of the institution in question As 
systemic importance is determined by the impact on the 
system of a financial institution’s failure or distress, and 
not  by  the  probability  of  such  an  event  occurring,  the 
(1)  For a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on systemic risk, see e.g. 
de Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and ECB (2009).
(2)  See ECB (2006), FSA (2009), IMF/BIS/FSB (2009), and Thomson (2009). Other 
potential (indirect) factors identified in these works are for instance the institu-
tion’s complexity and the type of assets it is holding.130
default probability of the financial institution in question 
is a not a driver of systemic importance. In particular, a 
sound bank may also be systemically important.
Default probabilities of the other institutions in the 
system  The  above  argument  does  not  imply,  however, 
that the default probabilities of the other institutions in 
the system may not affect the systemic importance of a 
particular financial institution. In particular, the potential 
impact of the failure or distress of a particular financial 
institution  is  likely  to  be  larger  in  stress  periods,  when 
the default probabilities of the other institutions in the 
system are greater, than in normal times. For this reason, 
the assessment of systemic importance involves a major 
element  of  state  dependency  and  time-variability.  (1)  As 
argued by FSA (2009), IMF/BIS/FSB (2009) and Thomson 
(2009),  this  may  make  it  difficult  for  supervisors  and 
regulators to determine a priori the degree of systemic 
importance  of  the  financial  institutions  in  the  system. 
Note, however, that the poor financial health of the other 
institutions in the system would not be a sufficient condi-
tion per se for a large systemic impact in the case of the 
failure or distress of the institution in question ; the idi-
osyncratic failure or distress of a small and unconnected 
institution should not necessarily have a large impact on 
the rest of the system, even in stress periods. Therefore, 
the default probabilities of the other institutions in the 
system are rather an indirect driver that may strengthen 
the effect of shocks that propagate through the system.
Dependence	of	defaults
Common exposures While the common exposure to a 
systematic shock affects the level of systemic risk, in that a 
systematic shock may adversely affect many institutions at 
the same time, the joint vulnerability to adverse systematic 
shocks is not a determinant of systemic importance. In 
particular, although a group of banks with an exposure 
to a common factor may be argued to be “systemically 
important as a herd”, the idiosyncratic failure or distress 
of a small institution in this herd that is only correlated to 
the  other  institutions  through  their  common  exposures 
should not necessarily have a large impact on the rest of 
the system.
Common  exposures  may  nevertheless  be  a  driver  of 
systemic  importance,  in  that  they  may  strengthen  the 
degree to which idiosyncratic shocks propagate through 
the system, for instance through the asset fire sales chan-
nel. In particular, the greater the degree of commonality 
between the failing or distressed institution’s assets and 
those  of  the  rest  of  the  system,  the  larger  the  poten-
tial adverse price impact of asset sales by the failing or 
distressed institution on the asset portfolio of the other 
institutions  in  the  system.  Hence,  although  common 
exposures as such are not a direct driver of an institution’s 
systemic  importance,  this  factor  may,  like  the  financial 
condition  of  the  rest  of  the  system,  nevertheless  play 
an indirect role in determining the strength of spillover 
channels.
Spillover channels Since systemic importance is defined 
as the potential impact of a financial institution on the 
system, the presence of spillover or contagion channels, 
or more generally the interconnectedness of the institu-
tions in a financial system, is clearly a driver of systemic 
importance.  As  discussed  in  Section  1.2.1,  there  are 
many potential channels through which spillover effects 
operate,  such  as  direct  exposures  between  financial 
institutions  through  the  interbank  money  market  and 
counterparty relations in derivative markets or payment 
systems. Essentially, if there were no channels directly or 
indirectly interconnecting the various financial institutions 
in the system (and linking the financial institutions to the 
real economy), there would be no possibility for shocks to 
propagate through the system : that would therefore limit 
the degree to which institutions are likely to be systemi-
cally important.
additional	factors
Size The size of a financial institution can be intuitively 
expected to be an important determinant of its systemic 
importance ; the larger an institution in terms of expo-
sures, transaction volumes or the volume of assets man-
aged, the larger the potential disruptions to the system in 
the case of failure or distress. The impact of size can be 
direct, in that the failure of a large player in the system 
potentially has a severe adverse impact on the functions 
performed by the system, or indirect, in that size increases 
a financial institution’s impact through the various spillo-
ver channels identified in Section 1.2.1. In this context, 
it  is  not  necessarily  the  financial  institution’s  absolute 
size that matters ; it is often the relative size in a market 
or product class that determines a financial institution’s 
impact in the case of failure or distress. For instance, the 
failure of a smaller institution in terms of total assets may 
have a large impact if the institution has a dominant posi-
tion in a key financial market.
Substitutability An additional determinant of a financial 
institution’s systemic importance is the degree of substi-
tutability of the institution’s activities ; the more difficult it 
is for other institutions in the system to provide the same 
or similar services, the less substitutable and therefore the 
(1)  This may also be the case, for example, simply because measures of interconnect-
edness can vary on a daily or even intradaily basis (FSA, 2009).131
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more important the institution may be. Examples of key 
services for which financial institutions may lack immedi-
ate substitutes are clearing and settlement and brokerage 
services. The potential costs from a lack of substitutability 
can be expressed in two dimensions : costs of delay and 
lower  cost  efficiency  of  performing  the  activities.  First, 
it may be that other institutions are able to assume the 
failing or distressed financial institution’s activities without 
additional  cost,  but  there  is  a  substantial  delay  in  the 
continuation  of  the  activities.  This  interruption  of  the 
activities  performed  by  the  failing  financial  institution 
may inflict large losses upon the system. Second, other 
institutions may be able to resume the failing or distressed 
financial institution’s activities without delay, but at higher 
cost. This again increases the losses for participants in the 
system. Finally, these costs are likely to be much more of 
a concern when the services provided are large in volume, 
or where they provide a key link in connections among 
financial institutions (IMF/BIS/FSB, 2009).
1.3  Identification of systemic importance
The above discussion indicates that a measure of a finan-
cial institution’s systemic importance should capture the 
impact of the institution’s failure or distress on the finan-
cial system. Consequently, the measure should intuitively 
depend on the drivers of systemic importance identified 
above, e.g. a financial institution that is highly intercon-
nected with the rest of the system should be identified as 
systemically more important than an identical institution 
which is less interconnected with the other institutions 
in the system. However, we have also argued that while 
some factors, such as the default probability of the institu-
tion in question, may affect the level of systemic risk, they 
should not influence the measure of systemic importance 
of an individual financial institution. In the remainder of 
this  section,  we  discuss  some  specific  issues  related  to 
the identification of the impact of a financial institution’s 
failure or distress that need to be taken into consideration 
when designing a measure of systemic importance.
We shall base our discussion on a hypothetical example, 
aiming to identify the systemic importance of Bank A. In 
particular, as depicted in Chart 1, suppose the financial 
system is hit by a systematic shock. In the first round, this 
systematic shock causes Bank A and Bank B to fail. The 
failure of Bank A in turn causes Bank C to fail. Finally, in 
the last round, the failure of Bank C causes Bank D to fail.
1.3.1    Spillover effects versus common exposure to 
systematic shocks
The first issue that arises in this context is that, in deter-
mining a financial institution’s impact on the system in 
the case of failure or distress, it is important to separate 
spillover or contagion effects from the effects of a system-
atic shock through common exposures. That is, the failure 
of Bank B, which occurs simultaneously with that of Bank 
A,  should  not  be  considered  as  part  of  the  impact  of 
Bank A’s failure. Ideally, the assessment of the impact of a 
financial institution’s failure on the system would be based 












ROUND 1 ROUND 2
cascade effect
ROUND 3132
on a failure of the institution caused by an idiosyncratic 
shock. The extent to which this idiosyncratic shock propa-
gates  through  the  system  will  determine  the  financial 
institution’s impact, and hence its systemic importance. 
Evaluating a financial institution’s impact on the system on 
the basis of its failure due to a systematic shock that has 
a simultaneous effect on a significant part of the system 
may substantially overestimate the institution’s impact, if 
the direct impact of the systematic shock on institutions 
other than the financial institution in question is not sepa-
rated  from  the  indirect  impact  through  spillovers  from 
that  institution  to  the  other  institutions  in  the  system. 
In our example, if the failure of Bank B is considered to 
result from the failure of Bank A, Bank A’s systemic impor-
tance will clearly be overestimated. The methodological 
corollary of this argument is that the measurement of a 
financial institution’s systemic importance may entail the 
separate identification of spillover effects and common 
exposures as drivers of the dependence or correlation of 
the financial institutions’ defaults.
1.3.2  Cascade or domino effects
The second identification issue relates to the identification 
of cascade or domino effects, where the failure of one 
financial institution causes the failure of other financial 
institutions in a first round, and these in turn cause the 
failure  of  several  other  institutions  in  a  second  round 
(and so on). In our example, the failure of Bank A causes 
Bank C to fail, which in turn causes Bank D to fail. In this 
case, the total impact of the failure of the first financial 
institution (Bank A) also depends on the impact that each 
of the other failing institutions have in the next rounds, 
i.e. the impact of Bank C on Bank D. This raises the ques-
tion  as  to  whether  only  the  first-round  effects  or  the 
effects of all rounds should be taken into account when 
assessing the degree of systemic importance for the pur-
pose of applying a special policy such as a tax or capital 
surcharge on systemically important institutions.
2.  Measuring systemic importance 
using market information
In this section we provide an overview of the methodolo-
gies used in the existing measures of systemic importance 
based on market information. First, however, we briefly 
discuss the motivation for using market information for 
the measurement of systemic importance.
2.1  Motivation for using market information-based 
approaches
As already noted above, given the many different chan-
nels through which spillover or contagion effects operate, 
measuring  a  financial  institution’s  degree  of  systemic 
importance  is  not  a  straightforward  task.  In  general, 
one can distinguish three broad approaches among the 
existing  techniques :  the  indicator-based  approach,  the 
network  approach,  and  the  market  information-based 
approaches.
indicator-based	and	network	approaches
Indicator-based  approach  This  approach  consists  of 
aggregating several quantitative indicators to produce a 
measure of systemic importance.  (1) These indicators proxy 
for different factors that could render a financial institu-
tion critical for the stability of the system, i.e. the drivers 
of systemic importance identified in the previous section. 
Some indicators that have been proposed in the literature 
include, for instance, total assets (to proxy for size), total 
interbank liabilities and assets (to proxy for interconnect-
edness) and the share of non-traditional banking activities 
(to proxy for substitutability). Each institution receives a 
score for each indicator, after which an aggregation tech-
nique is applied to produce a single synthetic measure of 
its systemic importance.
Network approach A second approach taken to meas-
ure systemic importance makes use of network theory to 
map the interconnections or interlinkages between the 
financial  institutions.  (2)  This  requires  inter  alia  data  on 
interbank loans, including cross-border exposures, as well 
as information on credit risk transfer instruments. Once 
these interlinkages are properly established, simulations 
of  shocks  to  specific  institutions  allow  tracking  of  the 
cascade  or  domino  effects  on  other  institutions  in  the 
network. The strength of such cascade or domino effects 
can be used to determine the systemic importance of a 
particular institution.
Not  only  are  the  data  requirements  for  the  above 
two  approaches  quite  substantial,  the  data  needed  for 
this  type  of  analysis  are  often  not  (publicly)  available. 
Although  there  are  currently  initiatives  under  way  that 
aim at satisfying some of the substantial data demands 
for assessing the systemic importance of financial institu-
tions  (3),  considerable  data  gaps  exist  and  will  probably 
persist in the future. This is especially true for the inter-
connections among financial institutions, which are one 
of the main drivers of systemic importance. In addition, 
the two approaches discussed above have some serious 
shortcomings. For instance, it is not clear what weight to 
(1)  See ECB (2006), IMF/BIS/FSB (2009), and Thomson (2009).
(2)  See e.g. Wells (2002) for the UK, Furfine (2003) for the US, Upper and Worms 
(2004) for Germany, and Nguyen and Degryse (2007) for Belgium. For a more 
complete list of applications for different countries, see IMF (2009).
(3)  See Praet (2010).133
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place on the various indicators in the aggregation of the 
individual indicator scores in the indicator approach. In 
addition, the aggregation of scores on separate indicators 
is unlikely to take sufficient account of the interactions 
between the various drivers of systemic importance. As 
for the network approach, an important criticism is that 
the  financial  institutions’  behaviour  in  reaction  to  the 
failure of another institution in the system is not taken 
into account.
market	information-based	approaches
Given the substantial data requirements and the shortcom-
ings of the indicator and network approaches, techniques 
using market information have recently received consid-
erable attention. In general, the only inputs required in 
these approaches are market prices (e.g. CDS, equity) for 
the financial institutions in the system, possibly combined 
with the financial institutions’ balance sheet information. 
Therefore,  the  main  advantage  of  market  information-
based approaches compared to alternative approaches is 
the public availability of the data. As this is true for many 
geographical areas, it allows consistent assessment of sys-
temic importance for financial institutions located in dif-
ferent countries and banking systems. In addition, market 
data are available at a high frequency (at least daily) and 
are forward-looking, implying that in many cases (changes 
in) systemic importance can be detected in a more timely 
manner than in the alternative approaches.
Obviously, approaches based on market information also 
have  their  shortcomings.  A  first  disadvantage  of  using 
market information is that market prices are only avail-
able for listed firms. This may mean that not all poten-
tially relevant institutions in the system can be taken into 
account  in  the  assessment  of  systemic  importance.  A 
second  shortcoming  relates  to  the  information  content 
of market prices. First, the underlying assumption when 
using market information for risk assessment is that mar-
kets are efficient. Furthermore, even if markets are infor-
mationally efficient, all relevant private information may 
not be reflected in the prices. Second, movements in both 
equity and CDS prices may be driven by factors unrelated 
to credit risk, such as changes in the liquidity premium or 
investor risk aversion.  (1) In addition, in periods of crisis, the 
information content of market prices may be affected by 
public intervention, for example.
Despite these shortcomings, the public and timely avail-
ability and the forward-looking nature of the data used 
in these market information-based approaches may make 
them potentially useful for macro-prudential policy and 
regulation,  at  least  as  complements  for  the  systemic 
importance measures produced by the other approaches.
2.2  Overview of methodologies used in market-
based measures of systemic importance
The systemic importance of a financial institution is deter-
mined by some measure of the impact of the institution 
on the financial system.  (2) In this subsection we offer an 
overview  of  the  techniques  used  to  construct  market 
information-based  measures  of  systemic  importance, 
developed both before and during the current financial 
crisis.
In general, one can distinguish between measures that 
assess the impact of the failure or distress of a particular 
institution in terms of the likelihood of spillover effects, 
and  measures  that  assess  the  severity  of  the  losses 
(1)  See e.g. Annaert et al. (2010).
(2)  This definition of systemic importance, which only considers the effects across 
financial institutions and disregards any effects on the real economy, is the one 







































associated with the failure or distress of the institution. 
Applications  of  the  former  class  of  measures  generally 
consider  the  probability  of  the  failure  or  distress  of  a 
number of institutions in the system conditional on the 
failure of another institution.  (1)
In  this  article  we  focus  on  measures  that  capture  the 
severity of losses.  (2) In particular, we distinguish between 
(i) methods that infer the impact of the failure or distress 
of a financial institution directly from market data, with-
out any need to quantify the overall risk in the system in 
advance, and (ii) methods that first quantify the overall 
risk  in  the  system  and  then  determine  the  contribu-
tion of each individual institution to system-wide risk to 
determine systemic importance. We label the first type of 
method as the co-risk approach, and refer to the second 
type as the portfolio approach. Table 1 provides an over-
view of this classification.
2.2.1  The co-risk approach
Co-risk measures of systemic importance generally infer 
the impact of the failure or distress of a financial institu-
tion directly from market data, such as stock returns or 
CDS spreads, without relying on a structural credit risk 
model to first quantify total risk in the system. The advan-
tage of these approaches is therefore that they require 
little information and make use of statistical methods with 
minimal assumptions, to obtain an estimate of a financial 
institution’s potential impact on the system.
(1)  See e.g. Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2005), Geluk, Haan and de Vries 
(2007), Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), and Zhou (2009).
(2)  As discussed by Zhou (2009), likelihood-based measures of systemic importance 
may not provide sufficient information on the systemic importance of a financial 
institution.
(1)  VaR and ES can also be derived for distributions other than loss distributions, e.g. the distribution of stock returns or CDS spreads.
Box 5  –  Value-at-risk and expected shortfall
The most commonly used risk measures are those that focus on extreme losses (i.e. the tail of the distribution) : 
value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES).
The chart below illustrates the concepts of VaR and ES. The chart shows the probability density of a loss distribution 
L of a hypothetical financial institution.  (1) In addition, the chart contains a series of vertical lines, indicating the 


























–10 –8 –6 –4 –2
Loss
0 2 4 6 8 10
VaR ES E(L)
5 p.c. probability
Source : McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005).135
mEaSuriNg ThE SySTEmiC impOrTaNCE OF FiNaNCial 
iNSTiTuTiONS uSiNg markET iNFOrmaTiON
Intuitively, co-risk measures determine the systemic impor-
tance of a financial institution as the increase in the risk 
of the financial system when the institution in question 
encounters  distress.  Perhaps  the  best  known  co-risk 
measure  of  systemic  importance  is  ΔCoVaR  proposed 
by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009). The calculation of 
ΔCoVaR makes use of the risk measure value-at-risk (VaR, 
see Box 1 for an illustration) and involves two main steps. 
First, the (unconditional) VaR from the distribution of, for 
instance, stock returns for the index of financial institu-
tions (the system) is computed. This represents a VaR for 
the financial system. Second, the conditional VaR (CoVaR) 
is computed as the VaR for the distribution of the stock 
returns of the index of financial institutions, conditional 
on the stock return of the financial institution in question 
being at its VaR-level (in distress). The difference between 
CoVaR and the unconditional VaR of the system is called 
ΔCoVaR,  which  is  the  eventual  measure  of  systemic 
importance.
Chart 2 illustrates the use of ΔCoVaR to measure systemic 
importance.  The  numerical  example  is  based  on  hypo-
thetical stock returns for the index of financial institutions 
in the system, whose probability distribution L is plotted as 
the solid line in the chart. Similarly, it is possible to obtain 
a probability distribution of the stock return of the system, 
conditional on the institution in question being in distress 
(the dashed line). Therefore, the impact of the failure or 
loss distribution, negative losses imply positive profits ; as E(L) = –2.5 < 0, the financial institution is on average 
expected to make a positive profit. In addition, the loss distribution is asymmetric (skewed to the left) ; therefore, 
even though the institution on average makes a positive profit, the probability of extreme losses for the financial 
institution is larger than the probability that extremely large profits will be realised.
The chart shows that the VaR95% is approximately 2.5, indicating that there is a 5 p.c. probability that the losses of 
the financial institution amount to at least this figure for a given time horizon.
Expected shortfall is an alternative risk measure that considers additional information from the tail of the loss 
distribution, beyond the threshold value considered exclusively by the VaR risk measure (as indicated by the shaded 
area in the chart). The idea behind ES is to obtain a weighted average of all values above VaR, i.e. the average 
loss level above the VaR95%-level of 2.5 and thus to obtain an average value for the tail of the distribution of the 
losses. In the chart above, ES95% is approximately 5.5.
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distress of the institution on the system, i.e. its systemic 
importance,  could  be  obtained  from  the  difference  in 
the VaR for the conditional and the unconditional stock 
return distribution. In Chart 2, the VaR95%(L)of the system 
is approximately 1.5, and the CoVaR95%(L) of the system 
(i.e. the VaR of the system conditional on the financial 
institution in question being in distress) is approximately 
2.5 ; then, the increase in the risk of the financial system 
when the institution encounters distress (ΔCoVaR) is 1.
Since  co-risk  measures  are  pairwise  measures,  they 
may also be used to measure the impact of a financial 
institution  on  each  of  the  other  individual  institutions 
in the system, rather than on the entire system at once. 
IMF  (2009)  considers  a  mapping  of  all  pairwise  co-risk 
measures across a number of institutions in the financial 
system.  (1) One way to obtain from this mapping an indi-
cation of the overall systemic importance of a financial 
institution may be to look at the average impact of the 
institution on all of the other institutions.
While  co-risk  measures  may  provide  an  assessment  of 
the systemically important institutions with only minimal 
distributional assumptions and no need to first quantify 
overall risk, these approaches have important drawbacks 
as well. One drawback is the interpretability of the scale 
of the measure of systemic importance. Thus, there seems 
to be no obvious answer to the following question : when 
is the impact of a financial institution on the system (or 
on another institution) large enough for the institution to 
be considered as systemically important ? The challenge 
is to determine a cut-off value that provides a clear and 
transparent method of ranking institutions according to 
their systemic importance.
2.2.2  The portfolio approach
In general, measuring the systemic importance of each 
of the institutions in the financial system via the portfolio 
approach  involves  two  steps :  (i)  quantification  of  the 
overall risks in the system ; and (ii) determining the contri-
bution of each individual institution to system-wide risk. 
Since the overall loss in the system provides a maximum 
scale as a benchmark for the individual institutions’ con-
tributions to total losses, the interpretability of the scale 
of the measure of systemic importance is not an issue, 
and individual institutions can easily be ranked. We now 
discuss the two steps of the portfolio approach in more 
detail.
Step	1	:	quantification	of	systemic	risk
Perhaps the most widely used technique for quantifying 
the overall risks in the system has its origins in Merton’s 
firm value model or contingent claims analysis. Merton’s 
model is an essential starting point for modelling credit 
risk of an individual firm. In this model, the value of the 
firm’s equity at some point in time is equal to the payoff 
of a European call option on the asset value. This means 
that a firm’s probability of default essentially depends on 
three parameters : the firm’s leverage, and the volatility 
and mean return of the asset value process. Multivariate 
extensions of Merton’s model are of general use for mod-
elling the default risk of a portfolio of firms ; these are the 
so-called structural models of portfolio credit risk. In the 
context of measuring systemic risk, the relevant portfolio 
is that of the financial institutions that make up the finan-
cial system.
To quantify systemic risk, an aggregate loss distribution 
is derived from the individual losses of each institution, 
under  assumptions  regarding  the  likelihood  of  default 
(PDs)  and  severity  of  losses  (LGDs),  together  with  an 
assumed  dependence  structure  across  the  institutions. 
The  aggregate  loss  distribution  represents  the  distribu-
tion of total losses of the financial system. A measure of 
portfolio risk, or in this case system-wide risk, will be a 
function of the estimated aggregate (portfolio) loss distri-
bution. The most commonly used risk measures are those 
that focus on extreme losses (i.e. the tail of the distribu-
tion) : value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES). Box 1 
discusses these risk measures, which are used to quantify 
systemic risk.
The main advantage of the portfolio approach is its abil-
ity to condense the information on losses of all individual 
institutions  into  losses  of  the  entire  system  in  an  effi-
cient manner. However, this efficiency comes at a price 
of  imposing  strong  assumptions,  such  as  distributional 
assumptions and assumptions regarding portfolio diver-
sification and default correlations. As a consequence, a 
substantial degree of model risk is embodied in the analy-
sis ; small changes in the assumptions may alter not only 
the estimated level of systemic risk, but also the set of 
institutions that are identified as systemically important.
Step	2	:	allocation	of	systemic	risk
Once systemic risk is quantified, the contribution of each 
financial  institution  can  be  determined.  This  contribu-
tion  will  be  the  eventual  measure  of  the  institution’s 
systemic importance. Thus, in the portfolio framework, 
determining the systemic importance of a given financial 
institution boils down to a problem of allocation among 
(1)  Rather than using ΔCoVaR, which is the difference between the conditional and 
the unconditional VaR, IMF (2009) considers a relative co-risk measure : the ratio 
of the conditional VaR (CoVaR) over the unconditional VaR, minus 1 (times 100).137
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the institutions of the system : many allocation schemes 
are  available  for  that  purpose.  In  particular,  allocation 
schemes can be divided into mechanisms based on dis-
crete  contributions,  partial  contributions,  the  Shapley 
value, and the continuous marginal allocation.  (1) In the 
following paragraphs, we provide an intuitive description 
of these allocation schemes.  (2)
Discrete contribution Intuitively, the discrete contribu-
tion  method  considers  the  difference  between  a  risk 
measure  based  on  the  loss  distribution  of  the  entire 
system and a risk measure based on the loss distribution 
of the system excluding the institution in question. This 
difference between the evaluated risk functions indicates 
the systemic importance of the institution. An example 
of a discrete allocation method is incremental VaR (iVaR). 
For  iVaR,  first,  the  VaR  of  the  loss  distribution  derived 
for  the  entire  financial  system  is  computed.  Second, 
VaR is computed for the loss distribution derived for the 
system consisting of all institutions except the institution 
in question. The difference between both VaR-measures 
is the incremental VaR. Applications of incremental VaR 
can be found in Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006a) and 
Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi (2010).
Partial contribution This class of allocation mechanisms 
is very similar to the discrete contribution method. The 
partial  distribution  approach  focuses  on  the  difference 
between  a  risk  measure  based  on  the  loss  distribution 
of the entire system (as in the discrete distribution) and 
a  risk  measure  based  on  the  loss  distribution  of  the 
entire system conditional on the institution in question 
being in distress. In the case of the partial contribution 
method, systemic importance is measured as the differ-
ence  between  an  unconditional  and  a  conditional  loss 
distribution, where in the latter case the financial institu-
tion in question is at some particular risk (distress) level. 
An  example  of  a  partial  allocation  method  is  ΔCoVaR 
(see Section 2.2.1 for a graphical illustration of ΔCoVaR 
in the context of co-risk measures). We refer to Elsinger, 
Lehar  and  Summer  (2006a)  that  introduce  conditional 
expected shortfall as a measure of systemic importance, 
and Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi (2010) for an application 
of ΔCoVaR in the portfolio approach.
Shapley value Neither the discrete contribution method 
nor the partial contribution method is “additive”, i.e. the 
sum of the risk contributions (the indicators of systemic 
importance  of  each  institution)  will  not  add  up  to  the 
overall risk of the portfolio (systemic risk) for these meth-
ods. An approach that does possess the additivity prop-
erty is the Shapley value, which represents an average of 
the institution’s discrete contributions to the risk of each 
possible  subportfolio  (or  “coalition”)  that  includes  this 
institution. The use of the Shapley value for determining 
the systemic importance of financial institutions was intro-
duced by Tarashev, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2009a,b), and 
applied in a real data setting covering six Canadian banks 
by Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi (2010).
Continuous  marginal  allocation  The  final  class  of 
allocation  methods  is  the  continuous  marginal  alloca-
tion.  Unlike  the  three  previous  methods  that  calculate 
contributions  or  allocations  based  on  large  changes  in 
the portfolio, i.e. either dropping the institution in ques-
tion from (a subset of)  the portfolio (iVaR, Shapley) or 
conditioning on the distress of this institution (ΔCoVaR), 
the  continuous  marginal  allocation  method  measures 
the change in the risk measure of the portfolio due to 
a small change in the portfolio composition. Intuitively, 
systemic importance based on the continuous marginal 
allocation method equals the VaR of the loss distribution 
of the entire system and the VaR of the loss distribution 
of the system with the portfolio weight of the institution 
in question changed by only a marginal amount. Like the 
Shapley value, this approach is additive, so the systemic 
importance indicators of the financial institutions in the 
system sum up to the total level of systemic risk. An appli-
cation of a continuous marginal allocation method in the 
context of measuring systemic importance can be found 
in Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009b).
3.  Assessment of existing market-based 
measures of systemic importance
In  this  section  we  present  an  assessment  of  the  exist-
ing  techniques  in  light  of  the  main  issues  identified  in 
Section 1. We first check whether the proposed measures 
of systemic importance are designed so as to capture the 
impact on the financial system of the failure or distress of 
a financial institution. Second, we assess to what extent 
the measures actually succeed in measuring the impact of 
an institution’s failure. The aim is not to offer an exhaus-
tive overview of all the properties of the existing meas-
ures, but rather to signal some potential weaknesses of 
different techniques.
measuring	impact	rather	than	fragility
Given the lack of conceptual agreement on systemic risk 
and systemic importance pointed out in Section 1, it is 
not uncommon to find that some approaches claiming to 
(1)  See e.g. Tasche (2000) and Koyluoglu and Stoker (2002) for a formal definition of 
the allocation schemes.
(2)  Note that the allocation schemes could, in principle, also be applied to directly 
infer systemic importance from market data. This is for example the case for 
ΔCoVaR, that has been applied both as a co-risk measure and as an allocation 
scheme in the portfolio approach.138
measure systemic importance may actually be measuring 
a different, but slightly related concept, such as the sys-
temic fragility of a financial institution. Systemic fragility 
is defined as the impact on some financial institution i, 
measured conditional on the distress of the system. One 
might argue that systemic fragility is the opposite of sys-
temic importance.  (1)
The distinction between measures of systemic importance 
and  systemic  fragility  is  rather  obvious  for  approaches 
that are based on conditional events. For example, par-
tial contribution methods and co-risk measures, such as 
ΔCoVaR, which considers the change in the risk of the 
system due to the distress of one institution, are clearly 
measures of systemic importance.  (2) The distinction, how-
ever, may be less clear for the allocation methods (other 
than the partial contribution) that are used to determine 
systemic importance in the portfolio approach. As a result, 
even though some authors argue that they are measuring 
systemic importance, they are actually measuring systemic 
fragility. For instance, (continuous) marginal risk contribu-
tions  may  result  in  a  measure  of  systemic  importance 
consisting of the losses of the institution in question in 
the case of the financial system being in distress. Clearly, 
this is a measure of systemic fragility : i.e., the extent to 
which the institution in question is impacted in the case 
the system is in distress, rather than a measure of the 
institution’s impact on the financial system.
identification	of	impact
As discussed in Section 1.3, there are two issues in iden-
tifying the impact of the failure or distress of a financial 
institution.  First,  in  determining  a  financial  institution’s 
impact  on  the  system  in  case  of  failure  or  distress,  it 
is  important  to  separate  spillover  or  contagion  effects 
due  to  the  institution’s  failure  from  the  effects  of  a 
systematic  shock  through  common  exposures,  which 
may  cause  simultaneous  failures  of  this  institution  and 
others. Second, the methodology to determine systemic 
importance should allow the identification of cascade or 
domino effects and take these into account in the assess-
ment of systemic impact.
Spillover effects versus common exposure to system-
atic shocks Co-risk measures provide enough flexibility 
so as to properly account for common risk exposures and 
therefore separate the direct effect of the institution on 
the system from the correlation in failures stemming from 
common exposures.
In contrast, the existing measures of systemic importance 
based on the portfolio approach do not disentangle the 
common exposure component from the spillover channel 
component in the institutions’ dependence structure. In 
the portfolio approach, the model design often includes 
some  form  of  factor  structure  that  determines  the 
dependence  between  the  asset  values  of  the  financial 
institutions, and accounts for the common exposure in 
the portfolio of financial firms.
Overall, the measurement of systemic importance of the 
financial institutions calls for the separate identification of 
the contagion effects and common exposure as drivers of 
the dependence in the individual institution’s risk levels. 
The importance of properly identifying these two sources 
of default clustering is an issue that has started to receive 
attention in the credit risk literature ; hopefully it will soon 
be introduced in the portfolio-based methodologies that 
measure systemic importance.  (3) The evolving methodolo-
gies may indeed profit from the literature on measuring 
contagion  effects,  which  was  primarily  developed  to 
analyse international stock market co-movement in the 
late nineties (1994 Mexican peso crisis, 1997 east Asian 
crisis).  (4)  Such  literature  provides  a  way  to  test  for  the 
existence of contagion effects and simultaneously account 
for common exposures. However, the downside is that the 
application of the test is on observed episodes of distress ; 
such an ex-post approach can render the methodology 
less useful for macro-prudential purposes.
Cascade or domino effects A second issue is that the 
methodology  to  determine  systemic  importance  should 
allow taking cascade or domino effects into account in 
the assessment of systemic impact. However, none of the 
currently proposed applications based on market informa-
tion is able to take this issue into account. For example, 
ΔCoVaR measures the total impact of a particular insti-
tution  on  the  system ;  no  distinction  is  made  between 
whether  this  impact  is  entirely  the  direct  consequence 
of the institution’s failure or the result of a sequence of 
failures in a cascade or domino chain. The same is true 
for the applications of the portfolio approach. Perhaps the 
most appropriate platform to capture cascade or domino 
effects is a network-based approach, as briefly discussed 
in Section 2.1. Along these lines, a series of papers by 
Alfred  Lehar  and  co-authors  introduce  a  hybrid  model 
that  combines  the  portfolio  approach  with  a  network 
model.  (5) That is, their model consists of two components : 
a multivariate version of Merton’s model, and a network 
model for interbank obligations. This second component 
(1)  If we denote systemic importance as the impact on the system measured condi-
tional on the distress of some financial institution i ; then fragility is the impact on 
some financial institution i measured conditional on the distress of the system.
(2)  The difference between measures of systemic importance and systemic fragility is 
also straightforward for the class of likelihood-based approaches.
(3)  See e.g. Azizpour and Giesecke (2008), Giesecke and Kim (2009) and Lando and 
Nielsen (2009).
(4)  See e.g. Claessens and Forbes (2001).
(5)  See e.g. Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006b), and Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi 
(2010).139
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is able to capture two important factors of contagion : 
spillover effects and feedback loops. The authors stress 
the importance of mapping the exposures across institu-
tions in order to fully capture the individual institution’s 
risk and it implications on the system.
Concluding remarks
This article examines the conceptual background relating 
to measuring the systemic importance of financial institu-
tions.  First,  although  systemic  risk  and  systemic  impor-
tance have some similarities, they are distinct concepts 
that differ in their defining aspects and drivers. Second, in 
order to properly measure the systemic importance of a 
financial institution, the measure must concentrate on the 
institution’s potential impact on the system in the event 
of failure or distress, which largely boils down to captur-
ing the spillover or contagion effects from the institution 
in question to the rest of the system. This entails a major 
challenge,  as  spillover  effects  operate  through  several 
channels, both direct and indirect.
In addition, the design of systemic importance measures 
raises several methodological challenges. One of these is 
the need to identify contagion or spillover effects due to 
an institution’s failure separately from common exposure 
effects  which  can  cause  the  simultaneous  failures  of 
several institutions. These challenges, together with state 
variability and time dependence of systemic importance, 
are critical, in that they render the a-priori assessment of 
systemic importance a difficult task. As a consequence, 
it may be desirable to evaluate the impact of a financial 
institution’s failure or distress in some type of through-
the-cycle or stress-testing framework, where other insti-
tutions’  default  probabilities  and  the  dependence  of 
institutions’  defaults  are  evaluated  at  stressed  levels. 
This might imply removing the time variation of systemic 
importance and only considering the worst case scenario.
Ultimately, however, the choice of assessment methodol-
ogy is likely to depend on the possible policy applications. 
For example, macro-prudential policy aimed at the inter-
nalization of the costs imposed on others by the failure 
of systemically important institutions requires a different 
measure than macro-prudential policy with the purpose 
of institutions paying an insurance premium to cover their 
own losses in the case of a systemic event ; whereas in the 
first case, a measure of systemic importance is required 
to determine the individual institutions’ contributions, in 
the second case, the appropriate measure would be one 
of systemic fragility. However, referring to this measure 
of systemic fragility as a measure of systemic importance 
would be a misnomer. It is exactly the existence of this 
type  of  misnomers  and  the  lack  of  a  solid  conceptual 
background  that  clearly  defines  systemic  importance 
and  how  it  differs  from  the  concept  of  systemic  risk 
that may generate confusion among market participants 
and supervisors when discussing and comparing macro-
prudential policy tools.140
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